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ANTONIO CABALLERO: CONFLICTING U.S. ANTI-TERRORISM LAW
AND U.S. INTERNATIONAL B ANKRUPTCY L AW
Jordan M. Zornes*
ABSTRACT
Antonio Caballero sought retribution for his father’s kidnap
and murder in the way Congress has made it possible: the American
Court System. Caballero obtained a default monetary judgment
against Colombian guerrilla forces, but as expected in collecting
against a terrorist organization, it was an uphill battle. When finding
attachable assets, Caballero must act fast, but in the present case, an
international bankruptcy proceeding sought to thwart his legitimate
efforts to satisfy his judgment. The question is: should Caballero win
in “race to the courthouse” fashion, or does the international
bankruptcy stay lead to an orderly distribution of assets? This note
breaks down the merits of each argument, and ultimately offers likely
solutions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Carlos Caballero was tortured daily, deprived of food and
water, and held for ransom during his kidnapping ordeal with
Colombian guerrilla forces.1 Carlos Caballero, for much of his life, was
a distinguished Colombian politician and outspoken critic of those
Colombian guerrilla forces.2 A five-time senator and former
ambassador to the United Nations, Caballero was not just targeted for
his outspoken critique of the Colombian guerrilla rebel groups but also
targeted for the placement of his country farm, which would have been
a prime route for drug-trafficking activities.3 Despite being paid a
“substantial sum” for his return, the guerrilla forces executed Carlos
Caballero, leaving his body on the side of a dirt road.4
Fearing for his safety, Carlos Caballero’s son, Antonio, fled his
home and country, leaving his property and businesses behind.5
Antonio was granted political asylum in the United States after
Colombian police told him they could not guarantee his safety.6
Eventually, Antonio Caballero brought suit under the Alien Tort
Statute (“ATS”) in Florida State Court, alleging that the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”), the National Liberation Army
(“ELN”) and the Norte del Valle Cartel (“NDVC”) colluded to smuggle
cocaine through the Magdalena River Valley where Carlos Caballero
owned land and ultimately colluded to kidnap, hold for ransom, and
kill Carlos Caballero.7 The three defendants were found guilty of
racketeering, torture, and extrajudicial killing, among other crimes.8
1

Deborah Bloom, Son of murdered Colombian diplomat gets $1 million in narcocash, CNN (Feb. 27, 2017, 10:02 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/27/americas/
narco-cash-dead-diplomat-son/index.html.
2
See id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Jim Wyss, Florida courts hand down $191 million ruling for Colombian
assassination, THE MIAMI HERALD (December 24, 2014, 5:34 PM), https://www.
miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/colombia/article4941369.html.
7
Id.
8
Id.
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The defendants did not respond to the complaint, and Antonio
Caballero was granted summary judgment.9 Additionally, Antonio
Caballero was granted a damages award in the amount of $191.4
million against FARC, ELN, and NDVC.10 The United States
government maintains that guerrilla and narco-trafficking interests are
related.11 The interrelatedness of guerrilla and narco-trafficking
interests help judgment holders, like Antonio Caballero, collect on
their judgments because it opens a new set of funds that can
potentially be traced back to the original terrorist group. That is, if the
guerrilla forces are aiding the cartel in moving illicit drugs, funds
related to the cartels would be open for collection attempts by victims
of terrorism, such as Caballero.
In related terrorism and drug-trafficking litigation, collecting
on judgments is difficult due to the veiled and attenuated links
between traceable monetary systems and the groups that are
responsible for the wrongs committed against plaintiffs.12 Another
FARC judgment creditor, Thomas Howes, observed on the prospects
of collecting on his judgment against FARC that the group does not
have “blocked assets in the US, never has and likely never will.
[Foreign terrorist organizations] simply do not open bank accounts or
hold assets in their name.”13 Howes further explains: “Instead, they
operate through cartels, groups, and individual drug traffickers and
money launderers—the agencies or instrumentalities of FARC.”14
Antonio Caballero unearthed one such agency or instrumentality
when linking Honduran banks Banco Continental and Inversiones
Continental (Panama), among other Rosenthal related businesses, to
FARC.15 Caballero presented multiple professionals who “with a
9

Id.
Bloom, supra note 2.
11
Wyss, supra note 7.
10

12

Bloom, supra, note 2 (explaining that “collecting money from a foreign terrorist
organization – particularly an armed rebel group that tries to hide its money beyond
the reach of US courts – is difficult especially if you’re not a US citizen.”).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
See Antonio Caballero’s Motion to Transfer Venue, In re Banco Continental, No.
20-10917-RAM (S.D. Fla. Bankr. Jan. 23, 2020), ECF No. 20-5 at 23–36 [hereinafter
Motion to Transfer].
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reasonable degree of certainty” could conclude that Banco Continental
was an agency or instrumentality of FARC.16 Banco Continental was
owned and operated by Jaime Rosenthal Oliva, his son Yani Benjamin
Rosenthal Hidalgo, and his nephew Yankel Antonio Rosenthal Coello,
and all were noted as specially designated narcotics traffickers
(“SDNT”).17 Yani Rosenthal was designated an SDNT in October of
2015 under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (“Kingpin
Act”).18 These companies aided and abetted international narcotics
traffickers, Los Cachiros, by providing money laundering services,
among other services, to the cartels and their criminal organizations.19
Los Cachiros were then linked to FARC, thus creating necessary links
from FARC to Banco Continental and providing potential assets to
garnish in order to satisfy the judgments.20 The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia concluded that, “for purposes of
post-judgment attachment under the [Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
(“TRIA”)] § 201(a), these entities are agencies and instrumentalities of
the FARC.”21 These are the same defendants in Antonio Caballero’s
garnishment action located in the U.S. District Court of South Dakota.22
Therefore, the same inferences and conclusions about the Rosenthal
banking organizations from the Stansell D.C. Court decision can be
extended to the Garnishment Action in South Dakota.
Antonio Caballero, the Stansell plaintiffs, and the Pescatore
plaintiffs are all judgment creditors of FARC seeking to satisfy
judgments that add up to over $500 million.23 The limited funds that
16

Id. Additionally, John Robert McBrien testified to his support for Caballero’s
original expert Bruce Bagley’s contention that Banco Continental is an agent or
instrumentality of FARC. See Antonio Caballero’s Motion to Change Venue, ECF 206 at 2–5.
17
Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., Treasury Sanctions Rosenthal Money
Laundering Organization (Oct. 7, 2015) (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Pages/jl0200.aspx).
18
Id.
19

Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, No. 10-471, 2019 WL
4040680, at *5–6 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2019).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
See Motion to Transfer, supra note 16, at 3–4.
23
See Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, No. 8:09-cv-2308-T26MAP, 2010 WL 11507790, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jun. 14, 2010); see Pescatore v. Pineda,
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can be located and legally garnished create an uphill battle for these
judgment creditors. The limited pool of attachable assets that can be
linked to agencies and instrumentalities of FARC create a race to find
and to garnish those assets through court orders.24 The present cases
of Caballero v. FARC (South Dakota Garnishment Action) and In re
Banco Coninental create an added wrinkle, as the assets that are subject
to garnishment are additionally sought in a Honduran liquidation by
Banco de los Trabajadores (“Bantrab”) who has been appointed as the
liquidating trustee by Honduran court order.25
The United States has divided policy interests in a case such as
this. For decades the U.S. has sought to hold terrorist parties
accountable for their actions against American nationals as well as
those who have been forced to flee their countries due to terrorist
activities.26 The U.S. also seeks to respect international financial order
by respecting international bankruptcy laws and aiding international
bankruptcies that are filed in the U.S.27 In the present case, a Honduran
liquidating trustee claims rights to Banco Continental’s frozen assets
along with the FARC judgment creditors.28
This article will examine the conflicting Congressional
intentions created when a foreign bankruptcy proceeding conflicts
with terrorism judgment holders’ collection efforts, and how this
conflict is likely to play out. Do American anti-terrorism laws support
a winner-take-all race to the courthouse? Is this the fairest outcome
considering the potential for similarly situated victims to be left in the
cold? Should an international bankruptcy proceeding thwart the
legitimate effort of a victim of terrorism’s collection on their judgment?
No. 08-2245, 2018 WL 5723138, at *78 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2018); see also Bloom, supra
note 2.
24
See H.R. Rep. No. 106-733, Agency Views, at 12 (2000) [hereinafter House Report].
25
See Banco Continental Petition for Recognition of a Foreign Proceeding, In re
Banco Continental, No. 20-10917-RAM (S.D. Fla. Bankr. Jan. 23, 2020), ECF No. 1,
at 1 [hereinafter Motion for Recognition].
26
See Stephen J. Schnably, The Transformation of Human Rights Litigation: the Alien
Tort Statute, the Anti-Terrorism Act, and JASTA, 24 INT’L & COMP. LAW REV. 285,
334–84 (2017).
27
Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-15bankruptcy-basics (last visited Feb. 10, 2021).
28
Motion for Recognition, supra note 26, at 1.
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THE UNITED STATES’ FOCUS ON VICTIMS OF TERRORISM
FINDING ACCOUNTABILITY

The United States has long been invested in combating wrongs
against its citizens as well as foreign nationals. The First Congress
enacted the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) in 1789, which has seen only
minor changes since its creation.29 The ATS creates federal district
court jurisdiction for torts perpetrated against a foreign national.30
Congress has since created other laws that protect American nationals
against terrorism.31 There seems to be a consensus in the United States
government and judiciary that international human rights law is “to
be treated more as a policy matter than a legal commitment.”32 This
United States policy is embodied in TRIA, which allows Antiterrorism
Act and ATS judgment holders to attach blocked assets of agencies or
instrumentalities of terrorist parties.33
A. History of the Alien Tort Statute
From the First Congress, the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) was
enacted to provide that “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”34 For
centuries, the ATS was used rarely as a jurisdictional statute, but the
ATS has become a “prominent vehicle for foreign nationals to seek
redress in U.S. courts for human rights offenses and acts of terrorism.35
The ATS “was intended to promote harmony in international relations
29

Schnably, supra note 27, at 289 n.5 (explaining the ATS was “enacted as part of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, and has remained essentially unchanged since then[.]”).
30
Stephen P. Mulligan, Cong. Research Serv., R44947, The Alien Tort Statute (ATS):
A Primer 1 (2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44947/4.
31
See generally Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2012); see also Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 (reauthorized on Dec. 20, 2019, through Dec. 31, 2027, as 133
Stat. 2534).
32
Schnably, supra note 27, at 293.
33
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 201, 28 U.S.C. § 1610 note (2012)
(Satisfaction of Judgments from Blocked Assets of Terrorists, Terrorist Organizations,
and State Sponsors of Terrorism).
34
Mulligan, supra note 31, at 1.
35
Id.
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by ensuring foreign plaintiffs a remedy for international-law
violations in circumstances where the absence of a remedy might
provoke foreign nations to hold the United States accountable.”36
Between 1789 and 1980, only two reported decisions invoked
the ATS as a basis for jurisdiction.37 The ATS came to the forefront
when the Second Circuit issued its Filártiga decision, where it held that
the ATS “permits claims for violations of modern international human
rights law.”38 While Filártiga caused an influx of ATS litigation, more
recent decisions have placed limits on ATS invocation.39 Sosa held that
the ATS allows federal courts to hear only a “narrow set” of claims for
violations of international law.40 The ATS was further narrowed in
2013 when the Supreme Court handed down its Kiobel decision
providing that ATS does not provide jurisdiction for claims between
foreign plaintiffs and defendants involving matters arising completely
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.41 The
petitioners claim must “touch and concern” the United States with
“sufficient force” to warrant ATS application.42 Further, in Jesner, the
Supreme Court limited the ATS from applying to foreign
corporations.43 While the Supreme Court has limited the reach of the
ATS in certain areas, one area where the ATS has increasingly been
cited is litigations by U.S. victims of foreign terrorism.44 The United
States government has shown an enduring commitment to victims of
terrorism having a way to hold their perpetrators accountable. There
is a balance that must be struck regarding the ATS in upholding
international human rights and balancing the foreign policy concerns
of potentially overstepping international norms in attaching
international assets.

36

Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
38
Id. at Summary.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 11.
41
Id. at 12.
42
Case Comment, Clarifying Kiobel’s “Tough and Concern” Test, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1902 (May 8, 2017), https://harvardlawreview.org/2017/05/clarifying-kiobels-touchand-concern-test/.
43
Mulligan, supra note 31, at 2.
44
Schnably, supra note 27, at 293.
37
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In the case of Antonio Caballero, Caballero was able to use the
ATS, as a resident alien and victim of a tort in violation of the law of
nations, to hold FARC, ELN, and NDVC accountable for the atrocity
that was committed against Caballero’s father. The defendants in the
lawsuit kept themselves absent and did not challenge Caballero’s
claims resulting in a default judgment.45 This default judgment must
have assets to attach, and TRIA allows the attachment of blocked
assets.
B. The Antiterrorism Act
The Antiterrorism Act (“ATA”), codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2331,
establishes a cause of action for any U.S. national, and only a U.S.
national, who has been injured by an act of international terrorism.46
The ATA is different from the ATS, which is a jurisdictional statute
that grants the U.S. district courts jurisdiction.47 While the ATA does
establish jurisdiction in the federal courts for a claim by U.S. nationals,
it also creates a cause of action, which distinguishes the ATA from the
ATS.48 International terrorism is defined as violent or dangerous acts
intended to intimidate a civilian population in violation of U.S.
criminal law.49 This civil liability created by the ATA can extend to
“donors and supporters of terrorism” as well as service providers such
as banks that provide material support to terrorist parties.50 In 2016
Congress expanded civil liability under the ATA to any person
“knowingly or recklessly contribut[ing] material support or resources”
to a person posing a “significant risk” of committing acts of terrorism
pursuant to the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”).51
The ATA provides for treble damages, which helps plaintiffs
attract attorneys to fight their cause, but it also is said to aid in the fight
45

Wyss, supra note 7.
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).
47
Alison Bitterly, Can Banks Be Liable for Aiding and Abetting Terrorism?: A Closer
Look into the Split on Secondary Liability Under the Antiterrorism Act, 83 FORDHAM
L. REV. 3389, 3398 (2015).
48
Id. at 3389.
49
Schnably, supra note 27, at 335.
50
See Olivia G. Chalos, Bank Liability Under the Antiterrorism Act: The Mental State
Requirement Under § 2333(a), 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 324–25 (2016).
51
See Schnably, supra note 27, at 369.
46
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against terrorism by attacking the funding that keeps terrorist
activities occurring.52
The Stansell Plaintiffs, et al. brought suit in the Middle District
of Florida citing the Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, which
provides:
(a) Action and jurisdiction.—Any national of the
United States injured in his or her person, property, or
business by reason of an act of international terrorism,
or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue
therefor in any appropriate district court of the United
States and shall recover threefold the damages he or
she sustains and the cost of the suit, including
attorney’s fees.53
In their lawsuit the Stansell plaintiffs allege FARC shot down
their reconnaissance aircraft, assassinated the pilot, and took the other
flight members captive for five years.54 The Stansell Plaintiffs
established that “no sovereign immunity or act of war exceptions to
the ATA apply” in that instance.55 Again, the FARC defendants did not
appear and were subject to a default judgment of $318,030,000.56 The
Court’s decision ended with the explanation that “inasmuch as the
FARC used profits from the manufacture and distribution of cocaine,
money laundering, and extortion to support their terrorist acts,
Plaintiffs [have] perfected liens on proceeds derived from these related
offense criminal activities.”57
Pescatore et al. plaintiffs also brought suit against FARC and
Juvenal Ovidio Ricardo Palmera Pineda (“Simon Trinidad”), a high
ranking member of FARC, under the ATA in 2008.58 Frank Pescatore,
while working as a geologist in Colombia, was kidnapped, held for

52

Id. at 336.
18 U.S.C. § 2333.
54
Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom. (FARC), No. 8:09-cv-2308-T26MAP, 2010 WL 11507790, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jun. 14, 2010).
55
Id. at *2.
56
See Id. at *2-4.
57
Id. at *4.
58
Pescatore v. Pineda, 345 F. Supp. 3d *68, *69–70 (D.D.C. 2018).
53
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ransom, and eventually killed.59 The perpetrators were members of
FARC who had shot Mr. Pescatore upon his attempted escape.60 In the
Court’s conclusion, U.S. District Judge Collyer found that, while FARC
and Simon Trinidad do not exist in the same fashion they did at the
time of Mr. Pescatore’s kidnapping and murder, and “there is no one
left to punish,” the law endeavors to provide the solace that other
remedies would perform by awarding monetary damages.61 The
Pescatore plaintiffs were awarded $69,000,000 after their damages
were trebled.62
C. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
Beyond the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993
and the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995, the insurance agencies did
not view terrorism as a risk that should be considered in underwriting
commercial insurance policies.63 In the aftermath of the September
11th terrorist attack, the insurance industry saw losses that were
double the largest loss in history up to that point.64 Some estimates of
the losses in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack total $47 billion in
2019 dollars.65 The reduced availability of insurance protecting against
acts of terrorism began to cause a strain on the U.S. economy.66 This
led to a change in the way the insurance industry viewed terrorism.67
The insurance industry believed terrorism losses were unsustainable
and uncertain when considering how large the risk exposure was, and
therefore, decided terrorism was an uninsurable risk. The insurance
industry sought federal intervention, and shortly thereafter the
59

Id. at *69.
Id. at *70.
61
Id. at *78.
62
See id.
63
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS,
https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_terrorism_risk_insurance_act_tria.htm (last
updated Dec. 15, 2020) [hereinafter NAIC].
64
Jeffrey E. Thomas, The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act – An Industry-Government
Partnership, 38 BRIEF 24, 24 (2009).
65
Background on: Terrorism risk and insurance, INS. INFO. INST. (Dec. 16, 2019),
https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-terrorism-risk-and-insurance.
66
NAIC, supra note 64.
67
See id.
60
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Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 was passed by Congress and
signed into law by President Bush.68
Originally created as a temporary three-year federal program
that would allow the federal government to share monetary losses
with insurers due to losses from a terrorist attack, the Act has been
renewed four times since.69 The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act allows
for attachment of blocked assets.70 Under section 201 of TRIA, where
a:
person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist
party on a claim based on an act of terrorism, or for
which a terrorist party is not immune . . . the blocked
assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked
assets of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist
party) shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid
of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the
extent of any compensatory damages for which such
terrorist party has been adjudged liable.71
As Circuit Judge Charles R. Wilson noted in Stansell v.
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, TRIA promotes “race to the
courthouse” style proceedings due to the fact that “a number of events
may occur which make satisfaction using a particular asset
impossible.”72 These occurrences may be the government making the
assets unreachable by “seizure or de-listing of the alleged agency or
instrumentality,” but also that a fellow judgment creditor may seek to
satisfy their own judgment by garnishing the relevant account.73
As evidenced by the enacting of statutes such as the ATS, the
ATA, and TRIA, the United States has shown a commitment through

68

Id.
Id.
70
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 201, 28 U.S.C. § 1610 note (Satisfaction of
Judgments from Blocked Assets of Terrorists, Terrorist Organizations, and State
Sponsors of Terrorism).
71
Id. § 201(a).
72
Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, 771 F.3d 713, 729 (11th Cir.
2014).
73
Id.
69
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Congressional action to terrorists being held accountable for the harms
they commit.
It is now established that the competing default judgment
plaintiffs, Caballero, the Pescatore plaintiffs, and the Stansell plaintiffs
have received judgments under the ATS and ATA respectively, and
they are allowed to execute on assets of agencies or instrumentalities
of FARC pursuant to TRIA section 201(a).74
D. Further Congressional Action Showing a Policy in Favor
of Anti-Terrorism Law
During the 1990s, President Clinton exercised his presidential
waiver of authority conferred by section 117 of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (“FSIA”), blocking default judgment holders from
attaching diplomatic property and frozen assets in satisfaction of their
claims against Cuba and Iran.75 The House of Representatives sought
to override this presidential waiver and allow the satisfaction of these
default judgments from frozen assets of the responsible State.76 The act
was called the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (“JVTA”), which
ultimately was not passed into law.77 Congress was not deterred and
sought further legal assistance outlined for victims of terrorism.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the
Flatow Amendment both signify a further push in fighting terrorism
by amending the FSIA to bar sovereign immunity for state sponsors of
terrorism.78 Under the amended section 1610(a)(7) of the FSIA a
foreign state’s property may not be immune from execution for a
judgment that was covered under section 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA.79 The
Flatow Amendment additionally allows an official or agent of a
foreign state on the state sponsor of terrorism list to be liable for injury

74

Id. at 722.
Jennifer K. Elsea, Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV. RL 31258 11–12, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31258.pdf (last
updated Aug. 8, 2008).
76
Id. at 12.
77
Id.
78
Schnably, supra note 27, at 344.
79
Id. at 345.
75
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to a U.S. citizen while the official or agent is acting within their scope
of employment.80
Following these changes, Congress further amended the FSIA
in 2008 through the National Defense Authorization Act.81 In these
changes, we see that Congress answered ambiguities in the 1996 FSIA
amendments by “expressly creating a cause of action against foreign
states for terrorism.”82 The amendment also found that property of a
foreign state or an agency of a foreign state could be used to satisfy a
judgment creditor’s claim.83
E. The Office of Foreign Asset Control
The Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) is a department
of the U.S. Treasury charged with enforcing economic and trade
sanctions imposed by the U.S. against countries and groups of
individuals.84 Typically, OFAC’s sanctions are imposed on countries
and groups that are involved in foreign aggression, terrorist activities,
and narcotics sales, among other acts.85 OFAC enforces sanctions that
were imposed by the U.S. government based on its foreign policy and
national security objectives.86 These policies are aimed at foreign
nations, terrorists, and narcotics traffickers who pose a threat to the
national security or economy of the United States.87
OFAC’s activities are authorized by Congressional legislation,
however, the president of the United States can use emergency powers
to freeze foreign assets falling under U.S. jurisdiction.88 The OFAC
policies are intended to disrupt the economies and everyday activities
of the groups that are involved in sanctionable activities.89

80

Id.
Id. at 358–59.
82
Id. at 359.
83
Id.
84
Will Kenton, Office of Foreign Assets Control, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.
investopedia.com/terms/o/ofac.asp (last updated Jan 25, 2021).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
81
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In the present case, the Rosenthal family businesses (Banco
Continental, Inversiones Continental (Panama), etc.) were subject to
OFAC sanctions and asset freezing due to their activities in aiding and
abetting narcotics trafficking into the United States.90 As an OFAC
designated SDNT, Banco Continental’s assets were considered
blocked for TRIA purposes.91 OFAC grants specific licenses granting
authorization to engage in a transaction that would be prohibited.92
This license would allow the release of blocked funds.93 Banco
Continental previously had these licenses until 2017 when the last
license expired.94
Provisions that allow the attachment of blocked assets seem to
conflict with OFAC’s power to block the assets of terrorists and
narcotics traffickers. However, TRIA allows plaintiffs to execute
judgments for compensatory damages on “blocked assets of that
terrorist party” “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.”95
Caballero claims the notwithstanding provision is a clear statement
that TRIA is “second to no law.”96 This provision, however, may not
quite mean what it says. Simply citing the notwithstanding provision
is insufficient to determine which of multiple statutory provisions
control in certain circumstances.97 For instance, a court held that

90

U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., supra note 18.
Stansell, 771 F.3d at 723.
92
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., OFAC Consolidated Frequently Asked Questions,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/frequently-asked-questio
ns/ofac-consolidated-frequently-asked-questions (last visited Feb. 2, 2021) (answered
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“directive to proceed with timber sale contracts ‘notwithstanding any
other provision of law’ meant only ‘notwithstanding any provision of
environmental law,’” which forced the Forest Service to comply with
other federal law requirements that may be conflicting.98
Southern District of New York courts specifically have
endorsed two different readings of this “notwithstanding” provision
in the TRIA collection program.99 One S.D.N.Y. court ruled the
“notwithstanding” provision applies to other relevant federal statutes
or regulations rather than all law.100 Another S.D.N.Y. court held the
opposite, that the notwithstanding provision of TRIA law meant
exactly what it says; that it preempts all provisions of law that may
block an asset from a TRIA judgment creditor.101 Later, in Harrison v.
Republic of Sudan, the Second Circuit explained, “[o]nce a district court
determined that blocked assets are subject to the TRIA, those funds
may be distributed without a license from OFAC.”102 Therefore, it is
unclear that TRIA asset collection laws supersede all law in addition
to debtor bankruptcy protection.
With regards to potential de-listing of the SDNT by OFAC, the
de-listing does not retroactively affect the garnishment action
instituted by plaintiffs.103 OFAC regulations delineate the result in that
situation:
Any amendment, modification, or revocation . . . of any
order, regulation, ruling, instruction, or license issued
by . . . [OFAC] shall not, unless otherwise specifically
provided, be deemed to affect . . . any civil or criminal
construed literally . . . and does not require the agency to disregard all otherwise
applicable law.” 92 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 1996).
98
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suit or proceeding commenced or pending prior to such
amendment, modification or revocation.104
Thus, should Mr. Caballero have seen his garnishment action
to fruition, the de-listing of the SDNTs and unblocking of assets would
not have affected his rights to the assets. Nonetheless, the bankruptcy
proceeding filed by Banco Continental stood in the way of Caballero’s
garnishment proceeding.
F. The Creation of a Race to the Courthouse
The race to the courthouse is a “first to file” rule that, taken to
its ultimate limit, is about filing “a fraction of a second sooner than the
competition” in order to gain various advantages such as selecting a
favored choice of forum.105 In the cases where there was a race to the
courthouse, certain parties had favored rights that had nothing to do
with the merits of their respective cases.106 In the Second Circuit, the
first-filed rule states “where there are two competing lawsuits, the first
suit should have priority, absent the showing of balance of
convenience or special circumstances giving priority to the second.”107
This is not about forum shopping, but about substantially similar
actions that are filed in federal court having comity amongst the courts
where the first-filed action takes precedence and the second-filed
action may be dismissed.108 The rule provides that when “actions
involving nearly identical parties and issues have been filed in two
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different district courts,” the court where the first suit is filed proceeds
to judgment.109
In this case, Antonio Caballero’s South Dakota Garnishment
Action is the first filed action that seeks garnishment of the Wells Fargo
blocked assets located in South Dakota.110 In a faceoff between the
fellow judgment creditors, Stansell and Pescatore, Caballero would
have the first bite of the apple and would likely take the full amount
of the Banco Continental blocked funds because the blocked funds do
not come close to fully satisfying Mr. Caballero’s original judgment.
Often, when Congress acts to allow terrorism victims to obtain
judgments against the perpetrators of their injuries, the collection
efforts create a race to the courthouse by virtue of the limited pool of
assets the victims are able to connect to the terrorist party.111 This “race
to the courthouse” has been an issue according to the executive office
when Congress heard testimony on the efficacy of the JVTA that
passed the House in 2000 but ultimately failed.112
Treasury Deputy Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat testified at the
House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and
Claims about the Clinton Administration’s views on the passing of the
Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2000.113 Mr. Eizenstat
recognized that, while the Administration and House shared a
common goal in seeking retribution for those that are victims of
terrorism, they see different ways of carrying out that end.114 The
Deputy Secretary outlined five “principal negative effects” that an act
allowing victims of terrorism to satisfy judgments from a State’s frozen
assets would not promote fairness and U.S. interests abroad.115
Specifically, in his third “negative effect,” Deputy Secretary Eizenstat
explained the executive’s belief that an act like the JVTA would create
a “race to the courthouse benefiting one small, though deserving,
group of Americans over a far larger group of deserving
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Americans.”116 Eizenstat explains the executive branch’s concern that
the JVTA would “frustrate equity among U.S. nationals with claims
against terrorism-list states.”117 He recognizes the arbitrariness of the
“winner-take-all” race that would be created.118 Therefore, the
satisfaction of claims would not be based on justice or who is
deserving, but based on who got in line or found assets first. He
specifically cites Alejandre, Flatow, and Anderson cases, which brought
about the JVTA, as a few of many claims brought by U.S. nationals
against Cuba and Iran.119 This recognition means that, while these are
the notable cases, there are many more claims that would be left
unsatisfied if only a small group is able to fully satisfy their claims.
This is one example of the recognition of what happens to fellow
claimants when federal terrorism acts allow the satisfaction of claims
through blocked assets.
In the end, the U.S. Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking
and Violence Protection Act of 2000, “which permitted certain victims
of terrorist acts to collect 100% of their compensatory damages from
the United States government.”120 In regard to Flatow, the plaintiffs
were still allowed to execute garnishments in collection of his punitive
damages award via the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 2000.121
This is exemplified in the present case where, should Caballero
collect the full amount of the Wells Fargo blocked assets, the Pescatore
and Stansell judgment holders will be left to look elsewhere to satisfy
their judgments. They would be left with nothing of the limited pool
of frozen assets from Rosenthal’s businesses. Instead of allowing this
“race to the courthouse” style of proceeding, Congress would have to
take legislative measures to change the inter-judgment creditor
competition. Congress may attempt to create a fund to pay for the
claims of victims of terrorism in a similar method to the Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act where the U.S. government
116
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satisfied claims. This may foster fairer conclusions to judgment
creditor races.
Ultimately, in the South Dakota Garnishment Action, the court
denied the fellow judgment creditor’s attempt to intervene because the
judgment creditors failed to show an injury in fact for standing
purposes.122 The Stansell and Pescatore judgment creditors are still able
to execute garnishment proceedings against other agencies and
instrumentalities of FARC.
Regarding Caballero’s garnishment action and Banco
Continental’s foreign proceeding, Antonio Caballero claims that the
first-to-file rule applies because his South Dakota Garnishment Action
was filed prior to Banco Continental’s foreign bankruptcy
proceeding.123 Citing In re Rohalmin, Caballero argues that their South
Dakota action was filed first and actions in the Southern District of
Florida should be transferred to South Dakota out of comity and the
similarity of the issues presented in each case.124 In that case, the
trustee claimed the “Dealership Defendants” had transferred their
dealership operations to new parties in order to avoid FLSA and tax
liabilities.125 Some of the defendants claimed there was a pending case
in Virginia with largely the same parties and issues that was an
appropriate and first-filed case.126 Quoting First Equitable Realty, III,
Ltd. v. Dickson, the defendants argued that “[w]here two actions
involving overlapping issues and parties are pending in two federal
courts, there is a strong presumption across the federal circuits that
favors the forum of the first-filed suit under the first-filed rule.”127
“Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit requires that the party objecting to
jurisdiction in the first-filed forum carry the burden of establishing
“compelling circumstances” to warrant an exception to the first-filed
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rule.128 That court did in fact transfer the case to the Eastern District of
Virginia.129
Banco de los Trabajadores, in their response to Antionio
Caballero’s Motion to Transfer, claim the first to file rule does not
apply at all.130 Bantrab cites a Southern District of Florida opinion
explaining the application of the first-filed rule, which considers “(1)
the chronology of the two actions, (2) the similarity of the parties, and
(3) the similarity of the issues.”131 Bantrab argues the first-filed rule
makes no sense in the bankruptcy context.132 In that case, the plaintiffs,
Lori Laskaris and Daniel Laskaris, filed a putative class action against
Fifth Third Bank alleging usury claims and breach of contract. In the
same case, another group of plaintiffs, the Klopfenstein et al. plaintiffs,
had filed a case in the Northern District of Ohio over six months
prior.133 Klopfenstein v. Fifth Third Bank had been transferred to the
Southern District of Ohio as the most convenient venue.134 Ultimately,
the Southern District of Florida dismissed and transferred the Laskaris
case to the Southern District of Ohio as the first-filed court, which
allows the first-filed court to decide “[w]hether or not both cases
should proceed independently” or not.135
Laskaris v. Fifth Third Bank did not deal with plaintiffs that
claimed rights to assets that were also assets claimed in the course of a
bankruptcy proceeding where a liquidating trustee sought rights to
the assets for their orderly distribution. The United States approach to
bankruptcy allows for the orderly distribution of assets, which is in
direct conflict with the race-to-the-courthouse style of garnishment
action that is present in the U.S. antiterrorism judgment and collection
efforts.
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THE UNITED STATES APPROACH TO BANKRUPTCY AND
THE AUTOMATIC STAY

The United States added chapter 15 to the Bankruptcy Code
with the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005.136 Chapter 15 is the U.S. domestic adoption of the Model Law
on Cross-Border Insolvency created by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law. Chapter 15 replaces section
304 of the Bankruptcy Code.137 The purpose of chapter 15 is to
“provide effective mechanisms for dealing with insolvency cases
involving debtors, assets, claimants, and other parties of interest
involving more than one country.”138 The primary objectives of
chapter 15 include:
(1) “cooperation between United States courts, the
United States Trustee, and United States debtors on the
one hand, and the courts and other competent
authorities of foreign countries on the other hand; (2)
greater legal certainty for trade and investment; (3) fair
and efficient administration of cross-border
insolvencies; (4) preserving and maximizing the value
of the foreign debtor’s assets; and (5) facilitating the
rescue of financially troubled businesses.139
Chapter 15 further provides:
”The bankruptcy court may, at the request of the
foreign representative, grant provisional relief
pending entry of an order granting the petition for
recognition such as: (1) staying execution against the
debtor’s assets located in this country; (2) allowing the
foreign representative to administer assets located in
136
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this country; (3) providing for the examination of
witnesses or the gathering of evidence regarding the
debtor’s assets, affairs, rights, obligations, or liabilities;
or (4) suspending or allowing the avoidance of certain
transfers.140
Regarding number (4), the provisional relief must be “urgently
needed to protect the debtor’s assets or the interest of creditors.”141
Chapter 15 has a mandatory recognition rule where the bankruptcy
court must, after notice and a hearing, enter an order recognizing the
foreign proceeding if the foreign proceeding and the foreign
representative meet chapter 15’s definitional requirements and the
filing requirements provided for in 11 U.S.C. § 1515 are satisfied.142 A
bankruptcy court may refuse to recognize a foreign proceeding if
recognition would be “manifestly contrary to U.S. public policy.143 As
stated earlier, a key bankruptcy provision is the automatic stay that
applies to property of the debtor located in the United States, and
prohibits actions against the debtor’s property.144 The automatic stay
applies once the bankruptcy court enters an order granting recognition
of the of the proceeding.145 The automatic stay stops the South Dakota
Garnishment Action initiated by Antonio Caballero and protects the
Banco Continental frozen assets should they be deemed property of
the bankruptcy estate.146
In the case this note is based on, Banco Continental, after being
accused of supporting drug trafficking, was ordered to undergo
“forced liquidation” by the National Banks and Securities Commission
(“CNBS”) of Honduras.147 Bantrab was declared the liquidating trustee
for Banco Continental.148 Grupo Continental, the parent organization
140
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of Banco Continental, claimed that a “forced liquidation would
‘impede’ Grupo Continental . . . from being able to pay its outstanding
invoices and its more than 11,000 employees[.]”149 Grupo Continental
claimed this would not occur with a voluntary liquidation.150
The prior history of the case is important in understanding
how and why the chapter 15 foreign bankruptcy proceeding was
initiated. Banco Continental held over fourteen (14) million dollars of
assets in the United States, and these assets were ordered blocked
“[p]ursuant to regulations promulgated by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control” (“OFAC”) and the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Regulations
and held by Wells Fargo.151 The Rosenthal Family were found to have
supported terrorist organizations such as FARC, the National
Liberation Army, the Norte del Valle Cartel, among others by money
laundering and other services in support of international narcotics
trafficking.152 The asset blocking designation recognizes that the
Government of Honduras initiated liquidation proceedings against
Banco Continental, and that Banco Continental was under the control
of the Honduras Government and a government-appointed
liquidator.153 The OFAC Designation Article also notes that “a
transaction to liquidate or wind down Banco Continental S.A. involves
a U.S. person, including a U.S. financial institution, or is within the
jurisdiction of the United States, that transaction would be prohibited
unless authorized by OFAC.”154 Thus, Wells Fargo was prohibited
from relinquishing the funds from their control without OFAC
authorization.
Wells Fargo then filed an interpleader action in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida to adjudicate
149
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who had rights to these funds.155 As the Wells Fargo Interpleader
Action notes, in late 2015, Bantrab, as liquidating trustee of Banco
Continental, received an OFAC license to wind down Banco
Continental’s assets, but the license did not allow for the unblocking
of property blocked pursuant to Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
sanctions.156
As the South Dakota garnishment action was winding down,
Banco Continental was forced to file a Petition for Recognition in the
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida under 11 U.S.C.
§ 1517. Bantrab realized they were late to the party and losing the “race
to the courthouse,” and by filing the foreign bankruptcy proceeding,
Bantrab sought the protection of the automatic stay while they sought
other venues for collecting the frozen assets.157 Thus, the garnishment
action in South Dakota could not be completed due to the injunction
thwarting actions against the property of Banco Continental, assuming
the property was still Banco Continental’s and therefore property
under the control of the liquidating trustee, Bantrab. With the
“recognition of a foreign main proceeding, actions against the debtor
and its property are stayed, transfers outside the ordinary course of
business must be approved by the court recognizing the foreign
proceeding, and parties holding assets of the debtor may be subject to
turnover orders. . . .”158
A. Which Law Supersedes?
The question remains, which law supersedes and dictates the
distribution of Banco Continental’s funds controlled by Wells Fargo?
The United States has significant interests in protecting international
bankruptcy proceedings as they respect comity with other nations in
the turnover of assets rightfully controlled by entities of those nations.
In the present case, the Government of Honduras seeks the turnover
155
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of the Banco Continental assets in order to satisfy Banco Continental
creditors that may not have been involved in the Rosenthal money
laundering organization. At the same time, the United States has a
significant interest in protecting judgment holders who have been the
victims of international terrorist acts. The latter has been an ongoing
dedicated policy matter of Congress for decades. In reviewing the
ATS’s original enactment in 1789, Congress has attempted to give
victims of terrorism and other torts the ability to hold those
accountable for centuries.
Bankruptcy cases are filed to thwart the actions of aggressive
creditors who aim to fully collect on what is owed to them at the
expense of other creditors. Caballero’s garnishment action is the exact
type of action the automatic stay provision is meant to halt. Bantrab
must file a foreign proceeding in order to carry out their duties as
liquidating trustee of Banco Continental’s assets.
B. Case Outcomes
There are many conclusions that can be reached in the
immediate case. The judgment creditors can split the Banco
Continental assets in a settlement. Banco Continental was the original
asset holder, and, as liquidating trustee, Bantrab takes over the mantle
of holder of the frozen assets. The three respective judgment creditors
all have a right to assets that belong to an agent or instrumentality of
FARC. This would likely be the fairest outcome where those that have
been wronged by FARC are able to, in a shared manner, recover a
small portion of their greater default judgments as well as Banco
Continental’s creditors obtaining a portion of the blocked assets in
satisfaction of their claims.
When a U.S. bankruptcy court “recognizes a foreign main
proceeding under chapter 15, section 1520(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code provides that actions against the foreign debtor or ‘property of
the debtor that is within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States’
are” subject to the automatic stay.159 A “foreign main proceeding” is a
159
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proceeding pending in a country where the debtor’s “center of main
interests” are located, whereas a “foreign non-main proceeding is a
proceeding in a country where the debtor has an establishment, but
not its ‘center of main interests.’”160 The proceeding of In re Banco
Continental would be considered a foreign main proceeding because
the liquidation of Banco Continental is being carried out in Honduras,
which is the principal place of business for Banco Continental.161 Thus,
the pending proceeding Bantrab has filed in the Southern District of
Florida is located where the “center of main interests” for Banco
Continental is located.
The question then becomes are the Wells Fargo accounts still
the property of Banco Continental and are they subject to the
automatic stay? The Department of the Treasury answers this question
by stating that the assets are merely blocked or “frozen” and that these
terms are merely connoting “a way of controlling targeted
property.”162 Ultimately, the title of the frozen property is still with the
target of the OFAC sanctions.163 “Blocking immediately imposes an
across-the-board prohibition against transfers or dealings of any kind
with regard to the property.”164
The court could lift the automatic stay pursuant to section
362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. This is a long shot because the court
would have to find “cause” to lift the stay, which is typically a good
faith filing balancing test involved in single-asset real estate cases.165
This is a high bar and one not likely met in the present case.
Eventually, the parties reached a private settlement. OFAC
delisted the five organizations, including Banco Continental, that were
a part of the Rosenthal Money Laundering Organization from their
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act designation dating back to
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October 2015.166 The United States Department of the Treasury found
that “[f]ollowing OFAC’s designation, Honduran authorities seized or
took control over multiple entities and properties owned by the
Rosenthal [Money Laundering Organization].”167 The Treasury
further explains that the “delisting serves as a successful example of
the ultimate goal of the Administration’s use of sanctions as a tool – to
bring about a positive change in behavior.”168
This delisting of the money laundering organizations signifies
that “all property and interests in property, which had been blocked
solely as a result of these designations, are unblocked and all otherwise
lawful transactions involving U.S. persons and these entities and
individuals are no longer prohibited.”169 As stated earlier, this delisting does not retroactively affect the disposition of the South Dakota
Garnishment Action, but with the complicated litigation that would
follow, a settlement comes as no surprise. The parties came together
and negotiated a split to the assets, which was approved by the courts
and parties involved.170 Issue 3 of the “Strategic Plan for Federal
Judiciary” is titled “The Effective and Efficient Management of Public
Resources.”171 This settlement furthers the policy encouraging the
efficient use of judicial resources by honoring an out of court
settlement all parties freely enter into and providing an expedient and
seemingly fair ending to an interesting ordeal.
III.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that the United States’ laws providing for the
attachment of blocked assets linked to terrorism creates a “race to the
courthouse” that favors a few creditors. Congress was briefed on the
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matter in congressional hearings and were satisfied with that process
for holding terrorism-linked entities accountable. However, it is
unclear what alternatives to the “race to the courthouse” are available.
The terrorism victims’ garnishment actions serve Congress’s goal of
punishing those who would aid terrorist activities.
Unfortunately, the settlement deems many of the intriguing
questions moot. But in law this is often the case until another, similar
case hits a federal docket. Bankruptcy lends itself to out of court
settlements, and in the name of judicial economy is the preferred
outcome.172 Moreover, collecting against terrorist parties is a difficult
proposition, whether locating funds or being the first to attach them.
For terrorism judgment creditors, even small victories are still
victories.
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